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Abstract
The evolution of the primary sex ratio, the proportion of male births in an
individual’s offspring production strategy, is a frequency-dependent process that
selects against the more common sex. Because reproduction is shaped by the
entire life cycle, sex ratio theory would benefit from explicitly two-sex models
that include some form of life cycle structure. We present a demographic
approach to sex ratio evolution that combines adaptive dynamics with nonlin-
ear matrix population models. We also determine the evolutionary and conver-
gence stability of singular strategies using matrix calculus. These methods allow
the incorporation of any population structure, including multiple sexes and
stages, into evolutionary projections. Using this framework, we compare how
four different interpretations of sex-biased offspring costs affect sex ratio evolu-
tion. We find that demographic differences affect evolutionary outcomes and
that, contrary to prior belief, sex-biased mortality after parental investment can
bias the primary sex ratio (but not the corresponding reproductive value ratio).
These results differ qualitatively from the widely held conclusions of previous
models that neglect demographic structure.
Introduction
Sex ratio evolution is the one of the oldest life-history
questions and a well-known example of frequency-depen-
dent selection. Although the primary sex ratio s1 (propor-
tion of offspring that are born male) is nearly equal in
many mammals, including humans, sex ratio biases have
been observed in countless other species (Karlin and Les-
sard 1986). Explanations for biased sex ratios often focus
on demographic differences (e.g., costs of offspring, mor-
tality of specific life cycle stages); however, much sex ratio
theory is based on purely verbal arguments or models
with minimal demographic structure.
Early explanations of sex ratio evolution, for instance,
relied on occasionally confused or vague verbal reasoning.
Darwin (1871) wrote that parents producing more of the
rarer sex would have fewer superfluous offspring and thus
be more “productive,” but later admitted the problem was
too intricate for him to reason through (Darwin 1874).
Fisher (1930) tackled this challenge with a famously succinct,
and infamously cryptic, verbal argument based on reproduc-
tive value (the present value of an individual’s future off-
spring). Because every individual has a male and female
parent, Fisher stated that the “total reproductive value” of
each sex in a given generation (i.e., their genetic contribu-
tions to all future generations, West 2009) must be equal.
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If males and females are equally costly to produce, the
sex ratio should evolve to equality, as any sex produced
in excess will have fewer mating opportunities, less repro-
ductive success, and thus smaller returns on reproductive
value; parents who are genetically predisposed to produc-
ing the rarer sex thus have more grandchildren to propa-
gate their genes, making the once rarer sex more
common over time (Hamilton 1967; West 2009). If, how-
ever, males and females are differentially costly (e.g.,
require different amounts of resources to produce), Fisher
claimed the sex ratio will evolve so that there is equal
“expenditure” in, rather than equal numbers of, both
sexes.
Trivers (1972) more precisely defined this expenditure as
“parental investment” – any investment a parent makes
(time, energy, resources, protection, etc.) to increase an off-
spring’s survival and reproductive success, at the cost of
investing in other children. If a son, for example, requires
less parental investment than a daughter, a parent can pro-
duce more successful sons (and, to a point, more reproduc-
tive value) per unit investment. Selection thus biases the
sex ratio toward sons until there is equal parental invest-
ment in sons and daughters. The optimal primary sex ratio
s1 is given by the “equal investment principle”:
Cms

1 ¼ Cf ð1 s1Þ
s1 ¼
Cf
Cm þ Cf
(1)
where Cm and Cf are some form of male and female
investment costs (Charnov 1982; Hardy 2002). Others
(e.g., Charnov 1982; Bull and Charnov 1988; Frank 1990)
have shown that the equal investment principle (1)
requires several implicit assumptions, including random
mating, fixed resource allocation, and additive offspring
costs with linear returns (e.g., doubling your investment
in sons doubles the grandchildren or genetic returns that
your sons produce).
Early mathematical treatments of Darwin and Fisher’s
arguments by D€using (1883, translated in Edwards 2000)
and Shaw and Mohler (1953) are the basis for many other
sex ratio analyses. They consider how an individual’s sex
ratio affects their fitness, through their relative number of
(or genetic contribution to) grandchildren. The fitness w
of a given parent has the form:
w ¼ n
4N
s1
S1
þ 1 s1
1 S1
 
(2)
when that parent produces n offspring at a primary sex
ratio s1, and the population at large produces N offspring
at a primary sex ratio S1. This formulation does not con-
sider stage structure within the sexes, nor does it account
for offspring production over more than two generations.
The fitness of a given sex ratio phenotype s1 is fre-
quency-dependent, in that it depends on the population
sex ratio S1. When the population sex ratio S1 = 0.5, (2)
is always w ¼ n2N, regardless of the individual sex ratio s1
(Shaw and Mohler 1953); this means that all sex ratios,
including the resident and any mutants, will have the
same fitness. Thus, when S1 = 0.5, no individual sex ratio
can have greater fitness than the resident, so no alterna-
tives sex ratios can increase under selection. The equal sex
ratio S1 = 0.5 is thus an “unbeatable” evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) (Maynard Smith and Price 1973). Subse-
quent studies have identified numerous factors that can
bias the ESS sex ratio from 0.5, including local mate com-
petition (Hamilton 1967), maternal condition (Trivers
and Willard 1973), parent–offspring conflict (Trivers
1974; Trivers and Hare 1976), and other unusual life his-
tory strategies or sex determination systems (Hardy
2002).
The ESS sex ratios can be affected by sex-biased off-
spring costs, especially in terms of parental investment
and the timing of sex-biased mortality (Hardy 2002; West
2009). Shaw and Mohler (1953) noted that sex-specific
survival probabilities cancel out of (2) and are thus irrele-
vant to selection, although they did not consider parental
investment. Fisher (1930) himself argued that only sex-
biased mortality during the period of parental investment
affects the sex ratio, and later analyses have largely ruled
in favor of his conjecture. Similar to Shaw and Mohler,
some frame sex ratio fitness in terms of a genetic contri-
bution to grandchildren (Kolman 1960). Others use a
population genetics approach to track the allele frequen-
cies of different sex ratios (Leigh 1970). The general con-
sensus is that sex-biased mortality after parental
investment cannot bias the ESS sex ratio, because
increased mortality is then compensated for by increased
reproductive opportunities (West 2009).
However, few of the models underlying sex ratio evolu-
tion theory explicitly consider stage structure, even
though the effect of mortality at different life cycle stages
is an inherently demographic issue. While some models
include age structure (e.g., Emlen 1968a,b; Charnov 1975;
Charlesworth 1977), only a handful are capable of includ-
ing more general stage structure, such as size, develop-
mental stage, or parental quality (e.g., Leimar 1996;
Schindler et al. 2015). Our models can incorporate all
three levels of structure, with age structure appearing as a
special case of stage structure.
The interaction between the sexes, and the effects of
distorted adult sex ratios on the mating success of males
and females, requires nonlinear models. Most models in
the literature, even those that incorporate population
structure (e.g., Pen et al. 1999; Fawcett et al. 2011),
assume that reproduction is unaffected by adult sex ratio.
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This removes one of the ways in which changes to the
primary sex ratio may affect invasion fitness.
Many sex ratio models also only consider offspring
production over two generations, rather than over an
entire lifetime. Models that incorporate both age structure
and lifetime offspring production are rarer and have pro-
duced more mixed results. In some age-structured models
(Charnov 1975), sex-biased survival cancels out of the fit-
ness expression, while in others (Emlen 1968a,b), mortal-
ity at all reproducing ages affects the sex ratio. These
discrepancies suggest that stage-specific, demographic fac-
tors deserve additional consideration in sex ratio theory.
Here, we use matrix population models to incorporate
multiple sexes, stages, and life cycle events into our evolu-
tionary projections. Furthermore, although previous stud-
ies of sex ratio evolution (e.g., Charnov 1979a, 1982;
Hardy 2002; Otto and Day 2007) have focused on finding
ESSs, additional methods are needed to determine
whether the population will actually converge to the ESS
in the long run. Here, we apply adaptive dynamics to
identify potential evolutionary outcomes and characterize
both their evolutionary and convergence stability.
Model and Methods
There are two main approaches for studying sex ratio
evolution (West 2009). One approach uses population or
quantitative genetics to track the dynamics of allele fre-
quencies (e.g., Eshel 1975; Charlesworth 1977; Uyenoyama
and Bengtsson 1979; Karlin and Lessard 1986) . The other
approach, which includes ESS theory and adaptive
dynamics, ignores the often complex underlying genetics
and instead focuses on trait phenotypes (e.g., Charnov
1982; Hardy 2002; Otto and Day 2007). We will use the
latter approach by considering population-level effects of
the sex ratio phenotype.
Following the two-sex modeling framework introduced
in E. Shyu and H. Caswell (in review a) , we construct a ser-
ies of continuous-time rate matrices that incorporate multi-
ple sexes, stages, and life cycle events. Because these models
are frequency-dependent, their long-term population
growth rates are given by the dominant eigenvalue of the
projection matrix at the equilibrium stage distribution
(Caswell and Weeks 1986; Pollak 1986; Hadeler et al. 1988;
Iannelli et al. 2005) . By applying adaptive dynamics theory,
we use these models to identify and characterize long-term
evolutionary outcomes for the primary sex ratio – namely,
singular strategies including, but not limited, to ESSs.
The two-sex matrix model
Consider a population with five stages: juvenile males m1
and juvenile females f1, adult males m2 and adult females
f2, and reproducing unions u (mated couples with one
male and one female each). Single adults interact to form
unions, which then produce new juvenile offspring
(Fig. 1). A summary of the variables, parameters, and
matrices in this model is provided in Table 1.
The population vector at time t is:
nðtÞ ¼
m1
m2
f1
f2
u
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA (3)
The total unions (pairs) formed per time is given by
the nonlinear harmonic mean mating function:
MðnÞ ¼ 2m2f2
m2 þ f2 (4)
which has frequency-dependent male and female per cap-
ita mating rates:
UmðnÞ ¼ MðnÞ
m2
¼ 2f2
m2 þ f2
Uf ðnÞ ¼ MðnÞ
f2
¼ 2m2
m2 þ f2
(5)
Mating, birth, and life cycle transition processes are
divided into three rate matrices (U, B, and T) as follows.
1 The union formation matrix U contains the per capita
mating rates (5):
UðnÞ ¼
0 0 0 0 0
0 UmðpÞ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 Uf ðpÞ 0
0 12UmðpÞ 0 12Uf ðpÞ 0
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA (6)
f1 f2 m2 m1
u
R(1-s1)/Ca Rs1/Ca
Uf Um
μf1 μf2 μm1μm2
αf αm
μm2+d μf2+d
Figure 1. Life cycle diagram for a 5-stage population with juvenile
males m1 and juvenile females f1, adult males m2 and adult females
f2, and reproducing unions u. The functions and parameters shown
here appear in the union formation matrix U (6) (red), birth matrix B
(7) (green), or transition matrix T (8) (blue) (from E. Shyu and H.
Caswell in review a).
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2 The birth matrix B contains the rates of male and
female offspring production by unions:
B ¼
0 0 0 0 Rs1Ca
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 Rð1s1ÞCa
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA (7)
where s1 is the (evolving) primary sex ratio, R is the total
resource investment rate, Ca is the average offspring
resource cost per birth. The quantity R/Ca is the union
reproductive rate (offspring produced per time).
3 The life cycle transition matrix T contains the rates of
mortality and transitions between stages:
T¼
ðlm1þamÞ 0 0 0 0
am lm2 0 0 lf 2þd
0 0 ðlf 1þaf Þ 0 0
0 0 af lf 2 lm2þd
0 0 0 0 ðlm2þlf 2þdÞ
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA
(8)
where lm1 and lm2 are the juvenile and adult male mor-
tality rates, lf1 and lf2 are the juvenile and adult female
mortality rates, am and af are the male and female matu-
ration rates, and d is the union divorce rate.
The average of these three rate matrices is the continu-
ous-time projection matrix
AðnÞ ¼ 1
3
Tþ Bþ UðnÞ½  (9)
where
dn
dt
¼ AðnÞnðtÞ (10)
In our model, the nonlinear mating rates (5) are
homogeneous of degree 0 with respect to n. This allows
all entries aij in A to depend on relative stage frequencies
rather than absolute abundances, that is:
aijðcnÞ ¼ aijðnÞ (11)
for any positive constant c. As a result, population growth
is frequency dependent, in that it is a function of the
population frequency vector:
p ¼ njjnjj (12)
where ‖n‖ is the 1-norm of n.
Frequency-dependent models like these ultimately con-
verge to an equilibrium stage distribution p^. The popula-
tion then grows or decays exponentially at a rate given by
the dominant eigenvalue k of Aðp^Þ. For calculating k, it is
sufficient to consider the dynamics of p (E. Shyu and
H. Caswell in review a):
dp
dt
¼ Is  p1|ð ÞAðpÞp (13)
To find p^, integrate (13) with the MATLAB ODE45
differential equation solver until p converges to p^ (e.g.,
until vector entries do not change significantly over con-
secutive integration intervals). We then calculate the pop-
ulation’s long-term growth rate k, the dominant
eigenvalue of Aðp^Þ, and its corresponding right and left
eigenvectors w and v. Note that the dominant right eigen-
vector of Aðp^Þ equals the stable stage distribution; that is,
w ¼ p^.
Table 1. A summary of the variables, parameters, matrices, and pop-
ulation properties in the two-sex matrix model. Mutant parameters
(not shown) are denoted by an apostrophe; for example, A0 is the
mutant projection matrix.
Matrices and Vectors
A projection matrix (9)
B birth matrix (7)
U union formation matrix (6)
T transition matrix (8)
n population density vector (3)
p population frequency vector (12)
p^ or w equilibrium stage structure
v reproductive value vector
Population Properties
k long-term population growth rate, dominant eigenvalue
of Aðp^Þ
m1, m2 juvenile, adult male stages
f1, f2 juvenile, adult female stages
u union (pair) stage
s1 primary sex ratio (proportion of offspring that are born
male)
s1 singular strategy (SS) value of s1
s2 secondary sex ratio (proportion of adults that are male)
s2 resulting s2 when s1 ¼ s1
vi reproductive value of stage i
Life Cycle Parameters
am, af male, female maturation rates
d divorce rate (rate at which a male-female pair bond
breaks)
lf1, lf2 juvenile, adult female mortality rates
lm1, lm2 juvenile, adult male mortality rates
R resource investment rate
M mating function (4) (total unions formed per time)
Um, Uf per capita mating rates (5)
Fm, Ff per capita fertility rates (63)
Offspring Cost Parameters
Cm, Cf male, female offspring resource costs
Ca average offspring resource cost (35)
a age of independence
I offspring investment rate
Dm, Df male, female parental mortality costs
Em, Ef male, female parent costs of reproduction (42)
lm2c, lf2c mated male, female mortality rates (44)
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Evolutionary analysis with adaptive
dynamics
Adaptive dynamics treats evolution as a series of “inva-
sions” by mutant phenotypes. Mutations are assumed to
occur infrequently, so that each mutation is either fixed
or lost before the next mutation arises (Geritz et al.
1998). Because each mutant is initially rare, its effects on
the existing resident population are considered negligible
(Metz 2006).
Consider a stable, monomorphic resident population
with phenotype x, projection matrix A, and growth rate
k. An invading mutant with phenotype y, projection
matrix A0, and growth rate k0 (which depends on the
environmental conditions set by the resident) has two
possible fates. If k0 < k, the mutant will ultimately die
out. But if k0 > k, the mutant can replace the resident
and induce evolutionary change (Metz et al. 1992).
The mutant projection matrix
Analogous to the resident projection matrix A in (9), the
mutant projection matrix A0 is the average of the mutant
rate matrices:
A0ðp^Þ ¼ 1
3
T0 þ B0 þ U0ðp^Þ½  (14)
The only phenotypic difference between mutants and
residents is the primary sex ratio they use. Just as the resi-
dent birth matrix B in (7) depends on the resident sex
ratio s1, the mutant birth matrix B
0 depends on mutant
sex ratio s01:
B0 ¼
0 0 0 0
Rs01
Ca
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Rð1s01Þ
Ca
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA (15)
Because mutants are so rare, we assume they mate only
with residents. As a result, the equilibrium resident popu-
lation sets the overall mating rate according to (5), and
the mutant mating matrix U0 is the resident mating
matrix U in (6) evaluated at the resident stable stage dis-
tribution p^:
U0ðp^Þ ¼
0 0 0 0 0
0 Umðp^Þ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 Uf ðp^Þ 0
0 12Umðp^Þ 0 12Uf ðp^Þ 0
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA (16)
Unless certain transition rates also depend on the pri-
mary sex ratio (e.g., parental survival in “Case 4: parental
mortality”, which has transition matrix (43)), the mutant
transition matrix T0 is the same as the resident transition
matrix T in (8).
Invasion fitness and the selection gradient
We define the invasion fitness sx(y) as the long-term
growth rate of a mutant with phenotype y, relative to the
growth rate of a resident with phenotype x, in the equi-
librium resident environment (as set by the resident’s
stable stage distribution p^). In our two-sex matrix model,
the invasion fitness is the difference in the dominant
eigenvalues of the mutant and resident projection matri-
ces (k and k0, respectively), where k0 is evaluated at the
resident’s stable stage distribution p^.
sxðyÞ ¼ k0ðp^Þ  k (17)
Only mutants with a positive invasion fitness can dis-
place the resident and cause evolutionary change.
The first derivative of the invasion fitness (17), with
respect to the mutant phenotype y, is the selection gradi-
ent D(x), which indicates the direction of selection at a
given resident phenotype x. In our model, the selection
gradient is the sensitivity of mutant eigenvalue k0 (Caswell
2010). In general, the resident and mutant phenotypes
can be written as vectors of trait values, h and h0, respec-
tively. The selection gradient is then:
DðxÞ ¼ @sxðyÞ
@y

y¼x
¼ @k
0
@h0|

h0¼h
¼

ðw0|  v0|Þ dvecA
0
dh0|

h0¼h
(18)
where w0 and v0 are the dominant right and left
eigenvectors of the mutant matrix A0ðp^Þ, scaled so that
v0|w0 ¼ 1.
Here, we consider the case where the only evolving trait
is the primary sex ratio. Thus, the trait vectors h and h0
simplify to the scalar resident and mutant sex ratios s1
and s01. The selection gradient at s1 is thus:
@k0
@s01

s01¼s1
¼ ðw0|  v0|Þ dvecA
0
ds01
 
s01¼s1
(19)
The selection gradient (19) can lend insight into both
the transient and equilibrium evolutionary dynamics of
s1. Although we will focus on equilibrium results here,
transient evolutionary dynamics can also be explored
using the canonical equation (as discussed in E. Shyu and
H. Caswell in review b).
Singular strategies
When the selection gradient (19) is 0, there is no direc-
tional selection on s1. The corresponding resident strategy
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s1 is called a singular strategy (SS). MATLAB’s fsolve
or fmincon functions can be used determine the values
of s1 where the selection gradient vanishes, which corre-
spond to s1.
Singular strategies are potential long-term evolutionary
outcomes that can be characterized by several criteria
(Geritz et al. 1998). One can, instance, determine whether
each SS is evolutionarily stable (an ESS that is resistant to
further invasion) or evolutionarily unstable (a branching
point that leads to phenotypic divergence), as well as
whether each SS is convergence stable (an evolutionary
attractor that the population will converge to through
small mutations) or convergence unstable (an evolution-
ary repeller).
For a one-dimensional phenotype, 2D visualizations of
the invasion fitness landscape called pairwise invasion
plots (PIPs) graphically indicate evolutionary and conver-
gence stability. A PIP shows where invasion fitness is pos-
itive or negative, depending on the resident phenotype x
and the mutant phenotype y (Fig. 2).
Singular strategies occur at intersections of the bound-
aries between negative and positive regions. If mutations
are small (do not differ drastically from the resident phe-
notype), the behavior of the PIP around a SS indicates
several properties (Fig. 3). If, for example, the vertical line
through the SS is entirely in the negative region (as in
Fig. 2), the SS is evolutionarily stable, that is, an ESS
resistant to further invasion.
Second derivatives of invasion fitness
Evolutionary and convergence stability can be determined
more generally using the local second derivatives of the
invasion fitness sx(y) (17) to the mutant phenotype y and
the resident phenotype x (Fig. 3). In our two-sex model,
these are the second derivatives of the mutant and resi-
dent eigenvalues, k0 and k, with respect to the vectors
describing mutant and resident phenotypes, h0 and h.
Again, we will only consider the primary sex ratio pheno-
type, so h and h0 simplify to s1 and s01, respectively.
The pure second derivative with respect to the mutant
phenotype is:
@2sxðyÞ
@2y
¼ @
2ðk0  kÞ
@h0@h0|
¼ @
2k0
@2s01
(20)
because k does not depend on the mutant sex ratio s01.
The pure second derivative with respect to the resident
phenotype is:
@2sxðyÞ
@2x
¼ @
2ðk0  kÞ
@h@h|
¼ @
2ðk0  kÞ
@2s1
(21)
because both k0 and k depend on the resident sex ratio s1.
Figure 2. A 3D visualization of an invasion
fitness landscape and the corresponding 2D
pairwise invasion plot (PIP). The + on the PIP
indicates where the invasion fitness is positive;
the – indicates where the invasion fitness is
negative.
Figure 3. Second derivative properties and the
corresponding pairwise invasion plots (PIPs) for
the eight types of singular strategies (adapted
from Geritz et al. 1998).
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The evolutionary stability of a singular strategy x*
depends on (20) (Geritz et al. 1998):
@2sxðyÞ
@2y

x¼y¼x
\0 evolutionarily stable (ESS)
¼0 may be selectively neutral (weak formESS)
[0 evolutionarily unstable (branch point)
8<
:
(22)
The convergence stability of a singular strategy x*
depends on both (20) and (21) (Eshel 1983; Geritz et al.
1996):
@2sxðyÞ
@2x
 @
2sxðyÞ
@2y
 
x¼y¼x
[0 convergence stable (attracting)
\0 convergence unstable (repelling)

(23)
In next two sections, we will present matrix calculus
equations for the pure second derivatives (20) and (21)
that determine evolutionary and convergence stability.
These expressions will rely on the equations (24) and
(32) respectively.
Second derivatives with respect to the mutant sex
ratio (20)
Calculating (20) requires the second derivatives of the
mutant eigenvalue k0 with respect to the mutant trait s01.
The corresponding mutant matrix A0 is a function of the
mutant trait s01 and the resident’s stable stage structure
p^ðs1Þ (as mutants are rare, their environment is com-
pletely determined by the resident). Because p^ is constant,
A0ðs01; p^Þ is a constant matrix.
As shown in Shyu and Caswell (2014, (38)), the second
derivatives of k0 can be found using matrix calculus:
@2k0
@2s01
¼ ðw0|  v0|  IsÞH vecA0; s01
 
þ dvecA
0
ds01
 |
H k0; vecA0½  dvecA
0
ds01
(24)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product, vec is the vec opera-
tor, and Is is a s 9 s identity matrix.
This expression depends on the Hessian (matrix of sec-
ond derivatives) of k0 with respect to A0:
H k0; vecA0½  ¼ 1
2
ðH1 þH|1Þ (25a)
where
H1 ¼ ðIn  v0Þ dw
0
dvec|A0
þ ðw0  InÞ dv
0
dvec|A0
(25b)
and the first derivatives of w0 and v0 are
dw0
dvec|A0
¼ k0In  A0 þ w0e|A0ð Þ1 w0|  In  w0e|ð Þ½ 
(26)
dv0
dvec|A0
¼ k0In  A0| þ k0v0w0|ð Þ1
 In  v0w0|ð Þ  v0|  k0ðv0  v0|Þ dw
0
dvec|A0
 
:
(27)
where e⊺ is a 1 9 s vector of ones.
The expression (24) also depends on the first and sec-
ond derivatives of A0 with respect to s01, which are given
by dvecA
0
ds01
and H½vecA0; s01 respectively. Recall from (9)
that:
A0 ¼ 1
3
T0 þ B0 þ U0ð Þ (28)
The first derivatives of A0 to s01 are:
dvecA0
ds01
¼ 1
3
dvecT0
ds01
þ dvecB
0
ds01
þ dvecU
0
ds01
 
(29)
The second derivatives of A0 to s01 are:
H vecA0;s01
 ¼1
3
H vecT0;s01
 þH vecB0;s01 þH vecU0;s01  	
(30)
These derivatives can be evaluated by hand or with a
symbolic math program. Because not all of the matrices
depend on s01 (U
0, for example, never does), both (29)
and (30) may simplify considerably.
Second derivatives with respect to the resident
sex ratio (21)
Calculating (21) requires the second derivatives of the
mutant eigenvalue k0 and resident eigenvalue k with
respect to the resident trait s1. The resident matrix A is a
function of the resident trait s1 and the resident stable
stage distribution p^ðs1Þ (as mutants are rare, they do not
affect resident dynamics). Because the resident’s dynamics
depend on its own stage distribution, Aðp^Þ is a nonlinear,
frequency-dependent matrix.
Frequency dependence makes the second derivatives of
k difficult to calculate directly. But once (20) is found
using (24), (21) can be calculated using the relationship:
@2k0
@2s01
þ 2 @
2k0
@s1@s
0
1
þ @
2ðk0  kÞ
@2s1
 
s01¼s1¼s1
¼ 0 (31)
which holds at any singular strategy s1 (Appendix A).
The first term in (31) is given by (20). The second
term in (31) is the mixed second derivatives of k0 to s01
and s1. This is shown in Appendix B to be:
@2k0
@s1@s
0
1
¼ ðw0|  v0|  IsÞKn2;sdvecC
dw|
dw
ds1
þ C| ðIn  v0Þ dw
0
ds1
þ ðw0  InÞ dv
0
ds1

 
(32)
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where
C ¼ dvecA
0
ds01
(33)
Thus, at any singular strategy, (21) can be found by
substituting the pure second derivative (20) and mixed
second derivative (32) into the relationship (31). The
convergence stability condition (23) thus becomes:
@2k0
@2s01
þ @
2k0
@s1@s
0
1

x¼y¼x
\0 convergence stable (attracting)
[0 convergence unstable (repelling)

(34)
Case Studies: Sex-Biased Offspring
Costs
If the sexes are differentially costly, Fisher (1930) predicts
that the sex ratio will evolve to favor the cheaper sex.
However, there are many potential interpretations of off-
spring costs. One sex may be costlier because it requires
more resources, has greater mortality, or more severely
reduces parental survival or reproduction (Charnov 1982;
Trivers 1985). Furthermore, these costs may occur at dif-
ferent points in an individual’s lifetime (Fig. 4).
We consider four alternative interpretations of off-
spring costs (summarized in Table 2). For each of these
four cases, we will determine how the primary sex ratio s1
evolves with respect to singular strategy location, evolu-
tionary stability, and convergence stability.
1 Offspring resource cost: Different amounts or rates of
resources are required to birth male and female off-
spring (Fig. 4, Point 1). Fisher’s sex ratio theory
implicitly assumes that parents have a fixed amount of
resources for producing offspring (Bull and Charnov
1988). Here, we will assume that total resource invest-
ment is always constrained to a constant rate.
2 Offspring mortality cost (during investment): Male and
female offspring mortality rates differ during the period of
parental investment (Fig. 4, Point 1–2); that is, while the
offspring is still consuming parental resources. We assume
that offspring death during this period frees up resources
that can be reallocated to other offspring (Charnov 1982).
3 Offspring mortality cost (after investment): Male and
female mortality rates differ after the period of parental
investment, once the individual is no longer consuming
parental resources. We will consider sex-biased mortal-
ity rates for both juveniles (Fig. 4, Point 2–3) and
adults (Fig. 4, Point 3–4).
4 Parent mortality cost: Male and female offspring increase
the mortality rates of their adult parents (Fig. 4, Point
3–4). For offspring of a given sex, both male and female
parents suffer the same mortality increase.
In each case, we will consider a two-sex, 5-stage popu-
lation with the life cycle in Fig. 1. We construct projec-
tion matrices of the form (9), adapting the functions and
parameters in rate matrices U (6), B (7), and T (8) as
necessary to reflect the offspring costs under considera-
tion. The corresponding resident and mutant matrices
will be used to calculate the selection gradient (19), from
which we can find the SS primary sex ratio s1. We will
determine the location and stability properties of s1 in
each case. We will also examine the secondary sex ratio s2
(proportion of adults that are male), focusing specifically
on s2 as the value of s2 when the primary sex ratio s1 is at
its SS value s1.
We make the following assumptions for the underlying
two-sex model:
• Males and females have identical vital rates, save for
the offspring cost of interest.
• Only the union stage can produce new offspring.
Unmated males and females mate to form unions, but
do not reproduce independently.
• Males are always the more “disadvantaged” sex, which
is often true in mammals and birds (Table 2). In Case
1, males have higher resource costs. In Cases 2 and 3,
male offspring have higher mortality. In Case 4, males
impose greater parental mortality. An increase in s1
thus represents greater production of the disadvantaged
sex, while a decrease in s1 represents increased produc-
tion of the advantaged sex.
We also make these assumptions for our evolutionary
analyses:
• The only evolving trait is the primary sex ratio s1. Thus,
new mutants only differ from established residents in
terms of their sex ratio phenotype.
• Mutations are small and do not differ drastically from
the resident. They are also rare enough not to affect the
1
Birth DeathIndependence Maturity
Parental investment After parental investment
2 3 4
Juvenile Adult
Figure 4. A timeline of key points in an individual’s lifetime. The individual is a juvenile from Point 1 to 3, and an adult from Point 3 to 4. The
period during parental investment is between Points 1 and 2; the period after parental investment is between Points 2 and 4.
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resident population, and infrequent enough to either
die out or reach fixation before the next mutation
arises (Geritz 1996, Metz 2006).
• The mutant phenotype is genetically dominant. Any
offspring with a mutant parent also has the mutant
phenotype.
Unless otherwise indicated, model parameters are fixed
at the values in Table 3. We will consider example param-
eter sets for two types of unions, “productive” and “poor,”
in particular. Productive unions are more persistent (low
divorce rate d) and can allocate more resources to off-
spring production (high resource investment rate R). Poor
unions, in contrast, are more transient (high d) and allo-
cate fewer resources to offspring production (low R).
Case 0: identically costly sexes
If the sexes are identically costly, selection should favor
equal production of males and females. The equal sex
ratio is thus an “unbeatable” ESS resistant to invasion
by alternative sex ratios (Hamilton 1967; Maynard Smith
and Price 1973). Consistent with this classic prediction,
our model has a convergent singular strategy at s1 ¼ 0:5
(example in Fig. 5). This result is robust to other vari-
ants of our model, including the various cases of off-
Table 2. Summary of four cases where male and female offspring are differentially costly.
Cases Sons have. . . Previous predictions Model results Example species
0. identical
sexes
same costs
and vital
rates as
daughters
 s1 = 0.5 is a selectively neutral
ESS (Fisher 1930; Uyenoyama
and Bengtsson 1982; Bull and
Charnov 1988)
 s1 = 0.5 is a selectively neutral
ESS (Fig. 5)
 explains the prevalence of near 1:1
sex ratios in most species (Hardy
2002)
1. offspring
resource
cost
greater
resource
consumption
 s1 favors the sex that costs
fewer resources to produce
 s1 is given by the equal
investment principle (1) (Fisher
1930; Charnov 1982; Frank
1990; Hardy 2002)
 s1 favors the sex that costs fewer
resources to produce
 but s1 is more biased to the
cheaper (more common) sex if
couples are poor (Fig. 6)
 in wasps, female larvae require larger
nest cells (Trivers 1985) or larger hosts
(Charnov 1979a) and more food
 in red deer and elephant seals,
males require more milk to wean
(Trivers 1985; Frank 1990)
2. offspring
mortality
cost (during
investment)
greater
mortality
and resource
consumption
 s1 favors the higher mortality
sex (Fisher 1930; Bodmer and
Edwards 1960)
 s2 will be equal or favor the
lower mortality sex (Bodmer
and Edwards 1960, Merrell
1981; Charnov 1982; West
2009)
 s1 favors the higher mortality sex
(Fig. 8A)
 but s2 also favors the higher
mortality sex (Fig. 8B)
 in many mammals, including humans,
males have greater mortality in utero
(Trivers 1985)
 rook birds have higher male nestling
mortality (Slagsvold et al. 1986)
3. offspring
mortality
cost (after
investment)
greater
mortality
 s1 is unaffected by mortality
(Fisher 1930; Kolman 1960;
Leigh 1970, Charnov 1975;
West 2009)
 s1 is biased toward the lower
mortality sex with juvenile
mortality (Fig. 9A and B)
 s1 is biased toward the higher
mortality sex with adult mortality
(Fig. 9C and D)
 adult survival is lower for males in
both humans (Wisser and Vaupel
2014) and penguins (Jenouvrier et al.
2010)
4. parent
mortality
cost
greater
parental
mortality
 s1 favors the sex that
reduces parental survival the
least (Charnov 1982)
 s1 favors the sex that reduces
parental survival the least
(Fig. 10)
 in albatross, male parents with female
offspring and low quality female
parents with male offspring die more
frequently (Weimerskirch et al. 2005)
 in humans, sons reduce maternal
longevity more than daughters (Helle
et al. 2002)
Table 3. Two-sex matrix model parameters for productive and poor
unions.
Parameter Description
Value
(Productive)
Value
(Poor)
lm1, lf1 male, female juvenile mortality
rates
0.1 0.1
lm2, lf2 male, female adult mortality rates 0.1 0.1
am, af male, female maturation rates 0.5 0.5
R total resource investment rate 20 10
d union divorce rate 0 1
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spring costs, additional stages, different mating functions,
etc.
In all cases, the singular strategy intersects with a verti-
cal isocline where mutant and resident growth rates are
equal. This is because any mutant that arises when the
resident is at the equal sex ratio has an invasion fitness
(17) of 0. When s1 ¼ 0:5, resident males and females are
equally abundant at equilibrium. Rare mutants thus have
equal mating opportunities with residents regardless of
their sex, so all invading sex ratios equally fit. As a result,
the equal sex ratio is called a “selectively neutral” strategy
(Bull and Charnov 1988) or a “weak form ESS” (Uye-
noyama and Bengtsson 1982).
As we shall see in “Evolutionary and convergence sta-
bility of the SS sex ratio”, convergence stable, selectively
neutral sex ratios like these are the predominant singular
strategies in our model.
Case 1: offspring resource costs
Consider the case where the production of male and
female offspring requires different amounts of resources.
These production costs are upfront, immediate invest-
ments made per birth or conception, and are thus unaf-
fected by later offspring mortality. Parents have a fixed
total rate R at which they invest resources (energy, food,
etc.) into offspring production, so the primary sex ratio
s1 determines how resources are allocated between the
sexes.
In this case, we will vary the relative production costs
of male and female offspring and determine the ESS sex
ratios that result. Assume that producing male offspring
requires Cm units of resources per time, while producing
female offspring requires Cf units of resources per time.
The average resource cost per offspring birth is thus:
Ca ¼ s1Cm þ ð1 s1ÞCf (35)
This average offspring cost appears in the birth matrix
B, as given by (7), and determines how many offspring
can be born per time. The union formation matrix U and
transition matrix T are given by (6) and (8).
If demographic structure is ignored, the equal invest-
ment principle implies that the primary sex ratio will
evolve to favor the cheaper sex. Assume, for example, that
Cm + Cf = 1; that is, there is some sort of offspring pro-
duction trade-off, so that as males become less costly,
females become more costly, and vice versa. Then by (1):
s1 ¼
Cf
Cm þ Cf ¼ Cf (36)
The SS sex ratio s1 increases, becoming more male-
biased, as the female cost Cf increases. Similarly, s

1
decreases, becoming more female-biased, as the male cost
Cm = 1  Cf increases.
Consistent with the predictions of the equal invest-
ment principle (36), the evolutionarily singular sex ratios
in our demographic model are biased toward the
cheaper sex (Fig. 6A). For poor unions, however, s1
deviates from the predictions of the equal investment
principle in even greater favor of the cheaper sex. This
is because the optimal sex ratio depends on a trade-off
between the cost of offspring production (where the
cheaper sex is favored because more of it can be pro-
duced) and the benefit of offspring reproductive success
(where the rarer sex is favored because it has more mat-
ing opportunities). However, an increase in mating
opportunities is not necessarily proportional to an
increase in later births, especially when unions have low
reproductive output. When unions are poor, the mating
advantage of the rarer, costlier sex is diminished, allow-
ing the trade-off to skew in favor of the more common,
cheaper sex.
Recall that s2 is the secondary sex ratios when s1 ¼ s1.
In this case, males and females have the same maturation
and mortality rates; thus, both s2 and s

1 have the same
values (Fig. 6B).
Case 2: offspring mortality during parental
investment
Rather than paying a single upfront production cost per
birth, like in Case 1, parents now pour investments into
Resident sex ratio s
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Figure 5. A PIP for sex ratio evolution when males and females are
identical. With the parameters in Table 3 (Case 1, productive unions),
(22) is 0 and (34) is 0.92 at s1 ¼ 0:5, confirming that the equal sex
ratio is a selectively neutral, convergence stable ESS.
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their offspring over an extended period of time (the per-
iod of parental investment shown in Fig. 4, Points 1–2).
An offspring’s cost (how much parental investment they
have consumed) thus accumulates over time, and the
cumulative cost of each offspring depends on how long
they receive parental investment.
An offspring stops receiving parental investment only
when it has reached the age of independence or died.
As a result, the expected cost per offspring born depends
on the juvenile mortality rates. If more male offspring
die before reaching independence, for example, the aver-
age cost per male born will be less than that of a
female. The average cost per male reared to indepen-
dence, however, will be higher than that of a female
(Fisher 1930).
We will now vary the relative mortality rates of male
and female offspring, during the period of parental
investment, and determine the resulting ESS sex ratios.
Assume that males and females have different juvenile
mortality rates and will thus have different expected costs
per birth. Again, parents invest in offspring at a fixed
resource rate R. If male offspring have higher mortality
rates, the average male born will consume fewer parental
resources (and have a lower expected cost) than the aver-
age female born.
First, we will determine the expected offspring costs,
per male or female born, as a function of the male and
female juvenile mortality rates. As in Slagsvold et al.
(1986), let I(x) be the instantaneous parental investment
rate in an offspring at age x. A parent’s cumulative invest-
ment J(x) in that offspring up to age x is:
JðxÞ ¼
Z x
0
IðzÞdz (37)
Let a be the age of independence, after which parental
investment ceases. If the investment rate is constant so
that I(x) = I, (37) becomes:
JðxÞ ¼ Ix; if x\a
Ia; if x a

(38)
Define f(x) as the probability that an offspring dies at
age x. If l(x) is the mortality rate at age x, it can be
shown that (Caswell 2001, Chapter 2):
f ðxÞ ¼ lðxÞe
R x
0
lðzÞdz
¼ lelx if l is constant for all x
(39)
The expected cumulative investment in an offspring,
accounting for its mortality rate during the investment
period, is:
E½JðxÞ ¼
Z 1
0
JðxÞf ðxÞdx
¼
Z 1
0
JðxÞlelxdx
¼
Z a
0
JðxÞlelxdx þ
Z 1
a
JðxÞlelxdx
¼
Z a
0
Ixlelxdx þ
Z 1
a
Ialelxdx
¼ I
l
1 elað Þ
(40)
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Figure 6. Case 1 singular strategy (SS) sex ratios, as a function of the male offspring cost Cm in (35). In this example, the female offspring cost
Cf = 1  Cm. (A) The primary sex ratio s1 for both productive (blue) and poor unions (red). The values of s1 predicted by the equal investment
principle (36) are indicated in black. (B) The corresponding secondary sex ratio s2 (green) in the poor unions case.
ª 2016 The Authors. Ecology and Evolution published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 11
E. Shyu & H. Caswell Demographic sex ratio evolution
Equation (40) is the expected cost per offspring birth
with an offspring mortality rate of l. Male offspring will
have a mortality rate lm1, while female offspring have a
mortality rate lf1. If males and females receive parental
investment at the same constant rate I, and have ages of
independence am = 1/am and af = 1/af respectively, the
expected male and female offspring costs per birth are
thus:
Cm ¼ Ilm1
1 elm1am
 
Cf ¼ Ilf 1
1 e
lf 1
af
  (41)
Substitute (41) into (35) to obtain Ca, the average off-
spring cost per birth. Again, the union formation matrix
U, birth matrix B, and transition matrix T are given by
(6), (7), (8) respectively.
Figure 7 shows that the resource cost for a given sex
declines as its mortality rate increases, as more and
more offspring die before significant parental investment
is made. Consider, for example, the case where sons
experience greater juvenile mortality than daughters. The
average resource cost (41) of each son born is less than
that of a daughter, because sons are more likely to die
before consuming the full amount of resources needed
to reach independence (Bodmer and Edwards 1960,
West 2009; Kahn et al. 2015). Based on the equal invest-
ment principle (1), we would expect the primary sex
ratio to evolve in favor of the higher mortality (lower
cost) sex.
In our model, s1 is indeed biased toward the higher
mortality (lower cost) males. As in Case 1, deviations
from the equal investment principle increase when unions
are poor (Fig. 8A) — again, because the mating advan-
tage of the rarer, costlier sex is seemingly insufficient to
compensate for its greater cost. The corresponding sec-
ondary sex ratio s2 is less biased than the primary sex
ratio, because the cheaper, higher mortality males pro-
duced in excess at birth are more likely to die before
reaching maturity (Fig. 8B). These results are consistent
with the predictions of Fisher (1930), which state that,
when the average expenditure is less for each boy born,
boys will be more numerous at birth, but less numerous
by the end of parental expenditure.
Offspring mortality rate
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Figure 7. The offspring resource cost (41) as a function of the
juvenile mortality rate l (I = 1, a = 0.5).
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Figure 8. Case 2 singular strategy (SS) sex ratios, as a function of the juvenile male mortality rate lm1 in (41). We will set the juvenile female
mortality rate lf1 = 1  lm1, so that increasing male mortality decreases female mortality and vice versa. (A) The primary sex ratio s1 for both
productive (blue) and poor unions (red). The values of s1 predicted by the equal investment principle (1) are indicated in black. (B) The
corresponding secondary sex ratio s2 (green) in the poor unions case.
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Although s2 is less biased than s

1, however, both sex
ratios are still biased toward the higher mortality sex. This
contradicts previous arguments that the sex ratio should
equalize to 0.5 by the age of independence (Bodmer and
Edwards 1960) or reproduction (Merrell 1981), or that
the sex ratio should favor the lower mortality daughters
by the end of parental investment (Charnov 1982).
Although the higher mortality sex does become less
numerous by maturity (as Fisher originally stated),
whether the sex ratio bias equalizes or even reverses is
not absolute and likely depends on other factors (e.g.,
Kahn et al. 2015).
Case 3: offspring mortality after parental
investment
Suppose that male and female mortality rates differ after
the period of parental investment (Fig. 4, Points 2–4).
Because sex-biased risks for disease, competition, selective
harvest pressure, etc. can act at any point in the life cycle,
we will consider both sex-biased juvenile mortality
(lm1 6¼ lf1) and sex-biased adult mortality (lm2 6¼ lf2).
As in Case 2, we will vary the relative mortality rates of
male and female offspring, now after the period of paren-
tal investment, and determine the resulting ESS sex ratios.
Assume that male and female offspring have the same
resource costs Cm = Cf, which we shall normalize to 1.
Then, the average offspring cost Ca in (35) is also always
1, and the union reproductive rate R/Ca depends only on
the (constant) resource investment rate R. As offspring
mortality does not affect the offspring resource costs, all
mortality must occur after the period of investment.
Thus, any juvenile mortality in Case 3 occurs in the per-
iod between independence and sexual maturity (Fig. 4,
Points 2 to 3).
Again, the union formation matrix U, birth matrix B,
and transition matrix T given by (6), (7), and (8)
respectively. We will fix the stage-specific mortality rates
in T at different levels and analyze the sex ratios that
evolve.
Juvenile mortality
Consider the case of sex-biased juvenile mortality after
parental investment. When unions are productive
(Fig. 9A, blue), s1 varies slightly as a function of juvenile
mortality. This contradicts the predictions of Fisher and
many others, who maintain that sex-biased mortality after
parental investment does not affect sex ratio.
When unions are poor (Fig. 9A, red), s1 favors the
lower mortality sex even more. This bias occurs for rea-
sons similar to those in Cases 1 and 2. When unions are
less productive, the increased mortality of a given sex is
not compensated for by its increased mating rates, caus-
ing the sex ratio to favor the lower mortality sex.
The secondary sex ratio s2 is even more biased toward
the lower mortality sex than the primary sex ratio
(Fig. 9B). This is the opposite of Case 2 (mortality occurs
during parental investment), where the secondary sex ratio
was less biased, but both sex ratios still favored the higher
mortality sex. This difference can be explained as follows.
When mortality occurs during parental investment
(Case 2), the primary sex ratio favors the higher mortality
sex. But although more of the higher mortality sex is pro-
duced at birth, that sex is also more likely to die before
reaching maturity. As a result, both the primary and sec-
ondary sex ratios may favor the higher mortality sex, but
the secondary sex ratio somewhat less so. When mortality
occurs after parental investment (Case 3, juvenile mortal-
ity), the primary sex ratio favors the lower mortality sex.
Not only is the lower mortality sex more likely to be pro-
duced at birth, but it also has less mortality later on.
Thus, both the primary and secondary sex ratios favor
the lower mortality sex, the secondary sex ratio somewhat
more so.
Adult mortality
Unlike juvenile mortality, adult mortality expedites union
dissolution through the death of mating partners. The
return of widows and widowers to the available singles
pool subsequently increases mating opportunities for the
rarer sex. As a result, s1 actually favors the rarer, higher
mortality sex (Fig. 9C), the opposite of the bias in the
juvenile mortality case (Fig. 9A).
Once again, these results contradict the Fisherian notion
that mortality after parental investment cannot bias the pri-
mary sex ratio. As in the case of juvenile mortality, the
magnitude of the sex ratio bias is modulated by union pro-
ductivity. Productive unions have less sex ratio bias, possi-
bly because their larger resource investment rate R
compensates for unions dissolving due to adult mortality.
However, increasing the divorce rate d may also reduce sex
ratio bias, as the mating advantage of the higher mortality
sex is reduced when unions dissolve more easily.
Although the primary sex ratio now favors the higher
mortality sex, adult mortality is high enough to skew the
secondary sex ratio s2 toward the lower mortality sex
(Fig. 9D).
Case 4: parental mortality
Consider the case where male and female offspring
impose different costs on the survival of their parents. As
in Case 3, we will assume equal male and female offspring
resource costs, so that Cm = Cf = Ca = 1. In Case 4, how-
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ever, males and females have the same mortality rates and
differ instead in the extra mortality costs, Dm and Df, that
they impose on their parents.
We now vary the relative mortality costs of male and
female offspring, on their adult parents, and determine
the resulting ESS sex ratios. We will assume there is a
trade-off between reproduction and survival, so that par-
ents with a greater total cost of reproduction have greater
mortality rates. Reproduction costs depend on the per
capita mating function Um from (5), the resource invest-
ment rate R, the primary sex ratio s1, and the male and
female parental mortality costs Dm and Df.
Let Em and Ef be the expected cost of reproduction per
male parent and per female parent respectively. Then:
Em ¼ UmR s1Dm þ ð1 s1ÞDf
 
Ef ¼ Uf R s1Dm þ ð1 s1ÞDf
  (42)
Note the parental mortality cost imposed per offspring
is fixed at birth as Dm or Df, regardless of later offspring
mortality. Alternatively, parents could continue incurring
mortality costs until their offspring have either died or
fully matured.
Because only adults in the union stage u produce off-
spring, adults in the single unmated stages m2 and f2 do
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Figure 9. Case 3 singular strategy (SS) sex ratios, as a function of the juvenile male mortality rate lm1 or adult male mortality rate lm2 in (8). In
the juvenile mortality case, the juvenile female mortality rate lf1 = 1 - lm1. In the adult mortality case, the adult female mortality rate
lf2 = 1  lm2. (A) The primary sex ratio s1 for both productive (blue) and poor unions (red) in the juvenile mortality case. The values of s1
predicted by the equal investment principle (36) are indicated in black. (B) The corresponding secondary sex ratio s2 (green) in the poor unions,
juvenile mortality case. (C) Primary sex ratios for the adult mortality case. (D) Secondary sex ratios for the poor unions, adult mortality case.
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not experience this extra offspring-induced mortality. The
transition matrix T (8) must now distinguish between
unmated adult mortality rates (lm2 and lf2) and mated
adult mortality rates (lm2c and lf2c).
T¼
ðlm1þamÞ 0 0 0 0
am lm2 0 0 lf 2cþd
0 0 ðlf 1þaf Þ 0 0
0 0 af lf 2 lm2cþd
0 0 0 0 ðlm2cþlf 2cþdÞ
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA
(43)
Only the mated adult mortality rates lm2c and lf2c are
increased by the costs of reproduction. Let this increase
be linearly proportional to the reproductive costs Em and
Ef, so that the mortality rates of mated adults are:
lm2c ¼ lm2 þ cEm
lf 2c ¼ lf 2 þ cEf
(44)
where c is a nonnegative constant. We will assume that
the baseline male and female mortality rates are equal –
that is, lm1 = lf1 and lm2 = lf2 – so the sexes only differ
in how they affect parental survival through Dm and Df.
Charnov (1982, Chapter 6) considers a case where
mothers experience higher annual mortality rates when
having sons instead of daughters. He states that the sex
ratio will be biased toward sons so that:
s1
1 s1 ¼
maternal mortality for rearing a daughter
maternal mortality for rearing a son
(45)
This is equivalent to (1), when offspring costs are
framed in terms of a parental mortality expense.
In qualitative agreement with Charvnov’s predictions,
s1 in our model favors the sex that induces less parental
mortality (Fig. 10A). This implies that evolution may
favor the preservation of already breeding adults, rather
than having them die producing new offspring. Favoring
the sex that induces less parental mortality also reduces
union dissolution due to partner death.
In contrast to Cases 1–3, productive unions (Fig. 10A,
blue) have more sex ratio bias than poor unions – likely
because adults with greater reproductive output also have
greater parental mortality. However, “strong juveniles”
with lower juvenile mortality and higher maturation rates
(Fig. 10A, black) reduce the sex ratio bias. In this case,
newborn juveniles are faster, more viable replacements for
their parents, thereby alleviating the costs of parental death.
Because parental mortality only affects adults, it occurs
after the period of parental investment. Thus, as in Case
3, the secondary sex ratio is even more biased toward the
cheaper sex than the primary sex ratio is (Fig. 10B).
Evolutionary and convergence stability of
the SS sex ratio
The evolutionary and convergence stability properties of
the SS sex ratio s1 are identical in Cases 1–4. In all four
cases, the second derivative expression (22) is approxi-
mately zero and (34) is negative (examples in Fig. 11).
Productive unions
Poor unions
Equal investment
Primary sex ratio s1*
Secondary sex ratio s2*
Dm  (Increasing male cost       ) 
s 1
* 
(In
cr
ea
si
ng
 m
al
e 
bi
as
   
   
 ) 
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
(A) (B)
Figure 10. Case 4 singular strategy (SS) sex ratios, as a function of male cost on parental survival Dm in (42), with c = 0.1. Wet set the female
cost Df = 1  Dm (if male offspring impose more parental mortality, female offspring impose less parental mortality, and vice versa). (A) The
primary sex ratio s1 for productive unions (blue), poor unions (red), and poor unions with strong juveniles (black). Strong juveniles have lower
mortality rates (lm1 = lf1 = 0.01) and faster maturation rates (am = af = 5). (B) The corresponding secondary sex ratio s2 (green) in the poor
unions case.
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Thus, all the singular strategies we have observed are con-
vergence stable “weak form” ESSs, as we previously encoun-
tered when male and female offspring were identically
costly (Case 0).
As a result, s1 is an evolutionary attractor to which
populations will ultimately converge through a series of
small mutations. Once the resident population is at s1,
any mutant sex ratio will have the same fitness as the res-
ident. However, as the invasion fitness (17) is zero rather
than positive, it will not displace the resident through
natural selection. Although there is no selection for a new
phenotype at a neutral ESS, different rare sex ratios could
potentially arise via neutral drift (which may be a mecha-
nism for generating genetic diversity), and even small
deviations might shift selective pressures (Bull and Char-
nov 1988).
The selective neutrality of certain sex ratios has also
been noted in models without demographic structure. In
Shaw-Mohler fitness formulation (2), for instance, all
individual sex ratios have the same fitness when the pop-
ulation sex ratio is 0.5. Our results suggest that selectively
neutral, convergence stable SS sex ratios may be integral
features of two-sex systems in general, as they are main-
tained even in models with more complex population
structure, and consistently appear over a wide range of
offspring cost interpretations and values.
Primary reproductive value ratios
Instead of considering the relative abundances of each
sex, as given by the sex ratio, one can also consider their
relative reproductive values.
Fisher (1930) originally stated that the total reproduc-
tive value of each sex in a given generation must be equal.
This notion of reproductive value has been invoked in
various ways in studies of sex ratio. Some (e.g., Bodmer
and Edwards 1960) specifically consider genetic contribu-
tions to grandchildren, so that an individual’s reproduc-
tive value is inversely proportional to the total surviving
individuals of their sex. Others (e.g., Grafen 2014) define
an individual’s reproductive value as the probability that
a random future gene can be traced back to that individ-
ual.
We will consider the lifetime reproductive value for
each population stage as follows. In a matrix model, the
dominant left eigenvector v of the projection matrix A is
a vector of stage-specific reproductive values (shown in
age-structured models by Goodman 1968; extended to
stage-structured models by Taylor 1990).
Recall that the selection gradient (19) depends on v0 as
follows:
dk0
ds01
¼ w0|  v0|ð ÞdvecA
0
ds01
(46)
For a s 9 1 population vector, the Kronecker product
in (46) is the 1 9 s2 vector:
w0|v0|¼ w1v1 w1v2 . . . w1vs j. . .j wsv1 wsv2 . . . wsvsð Þ
(47)
where wi is the i
th entry of w0 (stable stage frequency of
stage i), and vi is the i
th entry of v0 (reproductive value of
stage i).
At any singular strategy sex ratio s1, the selection gradi-
ent (46) is equal to 0. Substituting (47) into (46) and
evaluating at s1, we obtain:
w0|  v0| ¼ dvecA
0
ds01
 
s01¼s1¼s1
¼ 0 (48)
where
dvecA0
ds01
¼ 1
3
dvecT0
ds01
þ dvecB
0
ds01
þ dvecU
0
ds01
 
(49)
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Figure 11. Values of the evolutionary stability condition (22) and convergence stability condition (34) over a range of offspring costs. (A) Case 1,
productive unions. (B) Case 3 (adult mortality), poor unions.
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Cases 1 and 2
In Case 1 (offspring resource costs, B0 is a function of s01,
but U0 and T0 are not. Thus, (49) simplifies to:
dvecA0
ds01
¼ 1
3
dvecB0
ds01
(50)
The matrix B is given by (7) so that:
vecB0 ¼ 0 . . . Rs01Ca 0
Rð1s01Þ
C0a
0 0
 |
dvecB0
ds01
¼ 0 . . . RCfC2a 0
RCm
C02a
0 0
 | (51)
where Ca is given by (35).
Substituting (51) into (50), then into (48), we obtain:
Cf R
C2a
wsv1  CmR
C2a
wsv3 ¼ 0 (52)
Canceling out terms and rearranging, we obtain the
simple expression:
Cf v1 ¼ Cmv3 (53)
Again, vi corresponds to the reproductive value of stage
i. In our population vector (3), stage 1 is m1 (juvenile
males), and stage 3 is f1 (juvenile females). Thus, (53)
becomes:
vm1
vf 1
¼ Cm
Cf
(54)
The expression (54) shows that, at s1, the primary
reproductive value ratio vm1vf 1 (ratio of juvenile male to
juvenile female reproductive values) equals the ratio of
the sex-specific resource costs. This expression is analo-
gous to the inverse of the equal investment principle (1),
but is written in terms of the reproductive value ratio
rather than the sex ratio.
The same result (54) holds for Case 2 (offspring mor-
tality during parental investment, if Cm and Cf are given
by (41).
Case 3
In Case 3 (offspring mortality after parental investment,
(49) once again simplifies to (50). The matrix B is given
by (7) so that:
vecB0 ¼ 0 . . . Rs01 0 Rð1 s01Þ 0 0ð Þ|
dvecB0
ds01
¼ 0 . . . R 0 R 0 0ð Þ| (55)
Substituting (55) into (50), then into (48), we obtain:
Rwsv1  Rwsv3 ¼ 0 (56)
which reduces to
vm1 ¼ vf 1 (57)
In other words, the reproductive values of juvenile
males vm1 and juvenile females vf1 are equal at s

1. The
corresponding primary reproductive value ratio vm1vf 1 is thus
0.5 regardless of sex-specific mortality.
Case 4
In Case 4 (parental mortality cost, both B0 (15) and T0
(43) are functions of s01, so (49) becomes:
dvecA0
ds01
¼ 1
3
dvecB0
ds01
þ dvecT
0
ds01
 
(58)
After differentiating and performing several algebraic
manipulations, (48) yields the expression:
vm1 ¼ vf 1 þ c ðDf  DmÞðUf vm2 þ Umvf 2  ðUf þ UmÞvuÞ
 
(59)
In this case, the relationship between reproductive val-
ues is more complex. The amount by which vm1 deviates
from vf1 is determined by the mortality effect c. In the
limit as c ? 0, vm1 ? vf1, as in Case 3.
Discussion
Because reproduction is shaped by the entire life cycle,
and stage-specific offspring costs are often speculated to
affect sex ratios, demographic population models lend
additional insight into sex ratio theory. We have shown
how to formulate flexible demographic two-sex models,
and how to perform evolutionary analyses of these mod-
els using adaptive dynamics. Our analyses include calcula-
tions and characterizations of singular strategies that
depend on sex and stage differences, demonstrating how
demographic considerations affect evolution.
Using this approach, we found that four alternative
interpretations of sex-biased offspring costs may modify
the primary sex ratio (Table 2). In some cases, our results
contradict the widely held conclusions of models that
neglect demographic population structure, most notably
the classic belief that mortality after the period of parental
investment cannot affect the primary sex ratio.
The importance of union formation
Our results may arise our incorporation of a union stage.
Two-sex models that do not include unions allow adults
to reproduce directly and thus do not distinguish between
the “mating advantage” and “offspring production advan-
tage” of the rarer (e.g., higher mortality) sex.
Figure 12 compares the general structure of models
with and without unions. A “mating advantage” increases
the rate at which singles form unions (highlighted red
ª 2016 The Authors. Ecology and Evolution published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 17
E. Shyu & H. Caswell Demographic sex ratio evolution
arrow), while a “offspring production advantage” (high-
lighted blue arrow) increases the rate at which singles
ultimately produce offspring.
In models without unions, single males and females
produce offspring directly. In these models, the birth rate
is often proportional to the mating function (e.g., Caswell
and Weeks 1986; Hardy 2002), so the rarer (higher mor-
tality) sex will have greater fertility and produce more off-
spring. The directly increased “offspring production
advantage” of this higher mortality sex appears to coun-
terbalance its mortality and maintain s1 at equality.
In models with unions, singles must first enter the
union stage to produce offspring. Single adults enter
unions at rates given by the mating functions and may
return to the singles stages due to union dissolution from
divorce or partner mortality. In this case, the rare, higher
mortality sex will have greater mating rates, which may
increase its offspring production indirectly. However, this
“mating advantage” of the rarer sex is not always propor-
tional to its ultimate “offspring production advantage”. If
unions are poor, due to low resource investment rate R
or high divorce d, they ultimately may not produce many
offspring. The “offspring production advantage” of the
rarer (higher mortality) sex may thus be reduced, causing
s1 to favor the more common (lower mortality) sex.
As an illustrative example of a model without unions,
consider a 4-stage model that allows all adults to produce
offspring directly. This population contains nonbreeding
(juvenile) males m1 and females f1 that mature into
breeding (adult) males m2 and females f2, which then
produce new offspring (Fig. 13).
The 4-stage population vector is:
nðtÞ ¼
m1
m2
f1
f2
0
BB@
1
CCA (60)
We now use birth rates rather than mating rates.
Assume, as in Case 3, that all offspring resource costs are
normalized to 1 (Cm = Cf = Ca = 1). The total birth rate
B(n) is the product of the resource investment rate R and
the total mating function M(n) from (4):
BðnÞ ¼ RMðnÞ (61)
The corresponding per capita male and female fertility
rates are:
FmðnÞ ¼ BðnÞ
2m
(62)
Ff ðnÞ ¼ BðnÞ
2f
(63)
where the factor of 12 prevents double-counting offspring
from both males and females.
Because we have eliminated the mating process, the
mating matrix U is simply a matrix of zeros. The birth
and transition rate matrices are now:
BðnÞ ¼
0 s1Fm 0 s1Ff
0 0 0 0
0 ð1 s1ÞFm 0 ð1 s1ÞFf
0 0 0 0
0
BB@
1
CCA (64)
T¼
ðlm1þamÞ 0 0 0
am lm2 0 0
0 0 ðlf 1þaf Þ 0
0 0 af lf 2
0
BB@
1
CCA (65)
As in Case 3, we will consider sex-biased mortality after
parental investment. As shown in Figure 14, the equal sex
ratio s1 ¼ 0:5 is now preserved for both juvenile and
adult mortality. In the 4-stage model without unions,
Singles Offspring
Unions
Model with unions
Model without unions
Mating Um, Uf
Dissolution 
d, μm2c , μf2c
Reproduction R/Ca
Fertility Fm, Ff
Figure 12. A comparison of two-sex models with unions (top, red
arrows) and without unions (bottom, blue arrow). Parameters used as
indicators of union productivity (the divorce rate d and resource
investment rate R) are highlighted in yellow. The highlighted arrows
indicate the transitions increased by the “mating advantage” (red
highlighted arrow) and “offspring production advantage” (blue
highlighted arrow) of the rarer sex.
f1 f2 m2 m1
s1FfFm(1-s1)
μf1 μf2 μm1μm2
αf αm
s1FmFf(1-s1)
Figure 13. Life cycle diagram for a 4-stage population with juvenile
males m1 and juvenile females f1, and adult males m2 and adult
females f2. The functions and parameters shown here appear in the
birth matrix bfB (64) (green), or transition matrix T (65) (blue).
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higher mortality in one sex appears to be fully compen-
sated for by its higher fertility.
Kahn et al. (2013), who compared models with overlap-
ping generations (like ours) to more typical nonoverlap-
ping generation models, found that sex-specific adult
mortality in the presence of generational overlap can also
produce sex ratio biases. In our demographic analyses,
however, both models with and without unions have over-
lapping generations. Because the effect of sex-biased mor-
tality after parental investment disappears in the no-union
case (Fig. 14), generational overlap alone cannot explain
the patterns of sex ratio biases that we have observed.
The role of reproductive value
We have found that several well-known predictions about
the primary sex ratio are actually more applicable to the
primary reproductive value ratio. This includes the equal
investment principle (1), and the claim that mortality
after parental investment cannot bias the sex ratio.
Although we found deviations from the sex ratios pre-
dicted by the equal investment principle in Case 1 (off-
spring resource costs) and Case 2 (offspring mortality
during parental investment), (54) shows that an analogous
principle still holds for the reproductive value ratio
instead (Fig. 15A and B). We also found that mortality
after parental investment can bias the SS sex ratio (Case
3, offspring mortality after parental investment), but it
cannot bias the corresponding reproductive value ratio by
(57) (Fig. 15C and D).
Consequently, we would only expect the primary sex
ratio to follow an equal investment principle and be unaf-
fected by mortality after investment if it were equal to the
primary reproductive value ratio – that is, if the lifetime
contribution of each sex to future generations was directly
proportional to its relative abundance at birth.
However, the primary sex ratio and reproductive value
ratios appear to deviate in our 5-stage model, especially
when unions are poor. If unions are unproductive, sex-
specific reproductive values may be differentially reduced,
with the rarer sex having much less of a reproductive
advantage. The rarer sex must thus become even rarer to
raise its reproductive value to the same level as the more
common sex, biasing the primary sex ratio in favor of the
more common sex.
Extensions and caveats
We have focused on four common interpretations of
sex-biased offspring costs, but there are many additional
sex-specific differences that can affect the sex ratio,
which could studied by the appropriate addition of
population stages or rate matrices to our demographic
model. For example, male and female offspring may
differ not only in how they affect parental survival, but
also in how they affect future parental reproduction.
Female red deer, for instance, settle closer to their par-
ents than males do, increasing mate competition (Tri-
vers 1985).
Offspring may also benefit their parents through sex-
specific cooperation. In some cooperatively breeding
birds, for instance, young males stay with their parents
for several years to help rear new broods. This may cause
the sex ratio to favor the more “helpful” sex, as evidenced
(A) (B)
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Figure 14. Singular strategy (SS) sex ratios for the 4-stage (no unions) model, as a function of the (A) juvenile male mortality rate lm1, with
juvenile female mortality lf1 = 1 - lm1, or the (B) adult male mortality rate lm2, with adult female mortality lf2 = 1 - lm2.
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by male-biased fledgling ratios in woodpeckers (Frank
1990).
We also note that there is often not a single, fixed lim-
iting resource for offspring production (Frank 1990), as
we have assumed in Cases 1 and 2. The offspring costs or
gains per unit of parental investment are not always fixed
as well and may vary according to a nonlinear returns
model (Charnov 1979b). These factors may cause addi-
tional sex ratio biases that were not noted here. The evo-
lutionary effects of these other considerations, or multiple
costs acting simultaneously, could likely be modeled using
a similar approach.
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Appendix A: Relationship between
second derivatives at singular
strategies
Following Geritz et al. (1998), we note that sx(y) = 0 at
any singular strategy y = x = x* – that is, if the mutant
and resident phenotypes are identical, the invasion fitness
is 0. The directional derivative of sx(y) along y = x,
Dy=x[sx(y)], is thus also 0:
Dy¼x sxðyÞ½  ¼ @sxðyÞ
dx
þ @sxðyÞ
dy
¼ 0 when y ¼ x ¼ x
(A.1)
Similarly, the second-order directional derivative of
sx(y) along y = x must also be 0:
Dy¼x Dy¼x½sxðyÞ
 	
y¼x¼x
¼ @
@x
@sxðyÞ
dx
þ @sxðyÞ
dy
 
þ @
@y
@sxðyÞ
dx
þ @sxðyÞ
dy
 
¼ @
2sxðyÞ
@y2
þ 2 @
2sxðyÞ
@x@y
þ @
2sxðyÞ
@2x
¼ 0 when y ¼ x ¼ x
(A.2)
Assuming that sx(y) is twice continuously differentiable,
the following relationship holds at any singular strategy
x*:
@2sxðyÞ
@y2
þ 2 @
2sxðyÞ
@x@y
þ @
2sxðyÞ
@2x
 
y¼x¼x
¼ 0 (A.3)
In the two-sex matrix model, (A.3) becomes (31).
Appendix B: Calculating mixed
second derivatives
As in Shyu and Caswell (2014), the pure second deriva-
tives of k0 with respect to h0 are:
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@2k0
@h0@h0|
¼ d
dh0|
vec
dk0
dh0|
 |
 
(B.1)
The mixed second derivatives of k0 with respect to h0
and h are similarly:
@2k0
@h@h0|
¼ d
dh|
vec
dk0
dh0|
 |
 
(B.2)
It can be shown (Caswell 2010) that:
dk0
dh0|
¼ ðw0  v0Þ| dvecA
0
dh0|
(B.3)
Substituting (B.3) into (B.2), we obtain:
@2k0
@h@h0|
¼ d
dh|
vec
dvecA0
dh0|
 |
ðw0  v0Þ

 
(B.4)
To evaluate (B.4), we will use the following rule (Mag-
nus 2010) for derivatives of matrix products. Given
matrices Y (n 9 v) and X (m 9 n), the derivative of
their product with respect to a third matrix Z (p 9 q) is
dvecðXYÞ
dðvecZÞ| ¼ ðY
|  ImÞ dvecX
dðvecZÞ| þ ðIv  XÞ
dvecY
dðvecZÞ| :
(B.5)
Using (B.5), we can rewrite (B.4) as:
@2k0
@h@h0|
¼ ðw0|  v0|  IsÞ d
dh|
vec
dvecA0
dh0|
 |
 
þ dvecA
0
dh0|
 |
dvecðw0  v0Þ
dh|
¼ ðw0|  v0|  IsÞdvecðC
|Þ
dh|
þ C| dvecðw
0  v0Þ
dh|
(B.6)
where
C ¼ dvecA
0
dh0|
(B.7)
To evaluate the derivative in the first term of (B.6),
recall A0 is a matrix function of w(h).
Thus, to find the matrix derivative of C with respect to
h, apply the commutation matrix and chain rule for
matrix derivatives:
dvecðC|Þ
dh|
¼ Kn2;s dvecðCÞ
dh|
¼ Kn2;s dvecðC½wðhÞÞ
dh|
¼ Kn2;s dvecC
dw|
dw
dh|
(B.8)
where it can be shown (Caswell 2008) that
dw
dh|
¼ kIs  Aþ we|A ½w|  ðIs  we|Þ dvecA
dw|

 1
 ½w|  ðIs  we|Þ dvecA
dh|
(B.9)
To evaluate the derivative in the second term of (B.6),
we will use the following rule (Magnus and Neudecker
1999, p. 227) for the derivatives of Kronecker products.
Given matrices Y (u 9 v) and X (m 9 n), the derivative
of their Kronecker product with respect to a third matrix
Z (p 9 q) is
dvecðX YÞ
dðvecZÞ| ¼ ðIn  Kvm  IuÞ  ðImn  vecYÞ
dvecX
dðvecZÞ|


þ ðvecX IuvÞ dvecY
dðvecZÞ| (B.10)
Using (B.10), the derivative in the second term of (B.6)
becomes:
dvecðw0  v0Þ
dh|
¼ ðIn  v0Þ dw
0
dh|
þ ðw0  InÞ dv
0
dh|
(B.11)
By chain rule,
dw0
dh|
¼ dw
0
dvecA0|
dvecA0
dw|
dw
dh|
(B.12)
where dw
0
dvecA0|
is given by (26). Similarly,
dv0
dh|
¼ dv
0
dvecA0|
dvecA0
dw|
dw
dh|
(B.13)
where dv
0
dvecA0|
is given by (27).
Substituting (B.8) and (B.11) into (B.6), we obtain:
@2k0
@h@h0|
¼ ðw0|  v0|  IsÞKn2;s dvecC
dw|
dw
dh|
þ C| ðIn  v0Þdw
0
dh|
þ ðw0  InÞ dv
0
dh|

 
(B.14)
This expression is equivalent to (32) when the only
evolving trait is the primary sex ratio, so that h = s1.
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